^Sumantra Bose (يونيو 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. ص. 89. ISBN:978-0-674-02855-5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-08-19. He probably also calculated that after Pakistan's defeat and dismemberment in the December 1971 Bangladesh war, the regional balance of power had swung decisively in India's favor, leaving him with little alternative to accepting terms dictated by New Delhi.
^N. Khan (25 يونيو 2014). The Life of a Kashmiri Woman: Dialectic of Resistance and Accommodation. Springer. ص. 103–. ISBN:978-1-137-46329-6. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-16. The consummate victory of the Indian military bolstered Indira Gandhi's position as premier of India, and she dealt with the demand for plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir with a heavy hand. She declared that the Sheikh's insistence on restoring the pre-1953 constitutional relationship between the state and the Indian Union, which would afford greater autonomy and freedoms to the state, was inconceivable because, 'the clock could not be put back in this manner'.
^Sumantra Bose (يونيو 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. ص. 88. ISBN:978-0-674-02855-5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-08-19. In 1975 Sheikh Abdullah finally abandoned his self-determination platform. This was not a settlement Abdullah would have accepted or even considered -twenty, ten or even five years earlier. His politics and popularity since 1953 had been based on defiance of New Delhi's authoritarianism.
^Sumantra Bose (يونيو 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. ص. 88. ISBN:978-0-674-02855-5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-08-19. TIn return for Abdullah's release and appointment as IJK's chief minister, his ever-faithful associate, Mirza Afzal Beg, signed another 'Delhi accord' with the government of India whose terms verged on capitulation to New Delhi and Indira Gandhi. The agreement reaffirmed, virtually without modification, the terms of IJK's incorporation into India since 1953. A patently hypocritical clause stated that 'Jammu and Kashmir, a constituent unit of the Union of India, shall continue to be governed under Article 370." In reality, between 1954 and the mid-1970s, 28 constitutional orders "integrating" IJK with India had been issued from Delhi, and 262 Union laws had been made applicable in IJK.
^Victoria Schofield (30 مايو 2010). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. I.B.Tauris. ISBN:978-0-85773-078-7. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-16. Although Kashmir's special status, enshrined in article 370 of the Indian Constitution was retained, the state was termed ' a constituent unit of the Union of India. The Indian government was able 'to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian national flag, the Indian national anthem and the Constitution.' This effectively gave India control in the areas which mattered most. There was to be no return to the pre-1953 status.
^Sumantra Bose (يونيو 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. ص. 88. ISBN:978-0-674-02855-5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-08-19. The Delhi accord gave IJK's government the right to 'review' only those laws from the shared center-state 'concurrent list' of powers which had been extended to IJK after 1953, and to 'decide' which of them might 'need amendment or repeal'...This aside, the Delhi accord patronizingly confirmed IJK's right to legislate on 'welfare measures, cultural matters, social security, and [Muslim] personal law.'