In 1969, Capt. Karamat was directed to attend the Command and Staff College in Quetta where he was noted for his intellect and competence at every level of courses he took as required in the curriculum.: 533–534 [16] In 1971, Capt. Karamat graduated and qualified as the psc.[1]
In 1963, Lt. Karamat was posted in his Armoured Corps to initially commanding a formation of main battle tanks.[21] In 1965, Lt. Karamat commanded an infantry platoon during the second war with India in the Akhnur Sector in the Indian-administered Kashmir.: 14–15 [22][23]Lt. Karamat's platoon was the first unit that had penetrated 23 miles (37 km) into the enemy territory, which encouraged backup military companies to move forward into the enemy territory.[24] In this war performance, the 13th Lancers had suffered death of fourteen soldiers, including three officers, while twenty eight were wounded.[23] For this action, the 13th Lancers was awarded the battle honour, Dewa— Chumb and Jaurian of 1965, and was also awarded the title of The Spearhead Regiment.[24]
In 1995, Lt-Gen. Karamat rose to public prominence when he had the Military Intelligence (MI) to infiltrate within the Pakistan Army to apprehend the rogue culprits for attempting a coup d'état.[37] Acting under orders from the General Karamat, DGMIMajor-GeneralAli Kuli Khan monitored the activities of Major-GeneralZaheerul Islam Abbasi who himself was posted at the Army GHQ.[37] The MI tapped the conversations and tracked down the culprits behind the coup.[37] Upon revelation, Lieutenant-General Karamat forwarded the case and facilitated the high-ranking joint JAG court hearings at the specified military courts, and convened many proceedings while the hearings were heard by the military judges led by a Vice-Admiral.[40] His actions were widely perceived in the country, and for his efforts, General Karamat was conferred with national honours in public conventions and state gatherings.[40]
At the time of his promotion, he was the senior most general at that time, and therefore at promotion to four-star general, he superseded no one.[42] At the time of his promotion, there were four senior generals in the race to replace Kakar as Chief of Army Staff: Lieutenant-General Jehangir Karamat, chief of general staff (CGS); Lieutenant-General Nasir Akhtar, quartermaster general (QMG); Lieutenant-General Muhammad Tariq, inspector-general training and evaluation (IGT&E) at the GHQ; and Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi, commander XXX Corps stationed in Gujranwala.[43] As Chief of Army Staff, General Karamat tried to work with the Prime minister and President at once, but soon came to understand that the misconducts of politicians and bureaucrats would eventually lead to the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's final government.[44]
General Karamat reached to then-Speaker of the National AssemblyYousaf Raza Gillani and "leaked" an intelligence information and tried convincing Benazir Bhutto and President Leghari to resolve their issues, and emphasised to focus on good governance. At one point, General Karamat wrote:
In my opinion, if we have to repeat past events then we must understand that Military leaders can pressurize only up to a certain point. Beyond that, their own position starts getting undermined because the military is after all a mirror image of the society from which it is drawn.
— General Jehangir Karamat commenting on Benazir's dismissal, [44]
General Karamat drove Pakistan Armed Forces to focus on more professional duties rather than playing politics.[45] Karamat worked on integrating Pakistan's military on a common platform, and had his staff worked on inter-services coordination in the battlefield.[46] Karamat strengthened the joint work coordination and joint logistics of the military at the war time situations, resolving many issues that would hamper the performances of the inter-services in the war or peacetime situations.[47][48]
With requests made by Strobe TalbottCENTCOM commander, General Anthony Zinni and US Chairman Joint chiefs General Henry Shelton, met with General Karamat to withdraw the decision to conduct nuclear test.[49] Zinni'e meeting with Karamat was described by Strobe Talbott as less contentious. General Karamat and General Zinni were able to draw "soldier–to–soldier" bond.[49] General Karamat made it clear that the final decision would be carried out by the civilian government.[49] At the NSCcabinet meeting, the Pakistani government, military, scientific, and civilian officials were participating in a debate, broadening, and complicating the decision-making process.[49] Although, General Karamat debated towards presenting the national security and military point of view, the final decision was left on Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif's say.[49]
After the decision was made, General Karamat was notified of Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif's decision and asked the military to be stand-by orders. After providing the joint military logistics, the nuclear tests were eventually carried out on 28 May 1998, as Chagai-I, and on 30 May 1998 as codename: Chagai-II.[50] As dawn broke over the Chagai mountains, Pakistan became the world's seventh nuclear power.[47]
On 6 October 1998, General Karamat who lectured at the Naval War College in Karachi on the civic-military relations and presented the idea on reestablishing the official National Security Council (NSC) where military could have representation in the country's politics.[52] General Karamat openly spoke on the role of the internal intelligences, such as FIA and IB, carrying out vendettas-like operations against political opponents and insecurity-driven and expedient policies while Pakistan capsized, at the behest of the politicians.[52] Prime Minister Sharif and his cabinet members perceived this idea as Chairman joint chiefs's interference in national politics, therefore Sharif forced to resign Karamat when he criticised Pakistan's political leadership and advocated a National Security Council that would give the military a constitutional role in running the country, similar to Turkey's.[53] In 1998, Prime Minister Sharif decided to relieve General Karamat from the chairmanship of joint chiefs, eventually having him tender his resignation at the Prime Minister's Secretariat.
The relief of the famous and famed general by the popular politician led to a storm of public controversy.[53][54] Many influential ministers and advisers in Prime Minister Sharif's circle saw this decision as "ill-considered" and "blunder" made by the Prime Minister.[3] At the military, Admiral Fasih Bokhari (Chief of Naval Staff at that time) criticized General Karamat for resigning but Karamat defended his actions as "right thing" to do as he lost the confidence of a constitutionally and popularly electedPrime Minister.[55]
As General Karamat received a full guard of honourretirement in a colorful ceremony as Chairman joint chiefs and chief of army staff, Prime Minister Sharif's mandate plummeted and his popularity waned as the majority of the public disapproved of the decision to relieve Karamat.[55] Prime Minister Sharif's further suffered with wide public disapproval after appointing much-junior General Pervez Musharraf at the both capacity, overruling the Admiral Bokhari's turn as the Chairman joint chiefs.[55] In 1999, Musharraf's unilateral initiation of the Kargil war against India nearly pushed Pakistan and India to the brink of an all-out war between the two Nuclear states. Eventually, in the same year, Musharraf staged a successful coup d'état and overthrew Prime Minister Sharif.[56]
On 23 March 2006, Pakistani news media reported that Ambassador Karamat was to be replaced by retired Major GeneralMahmud Ali Durrani. The reports further stated Ambassador Karamat, who took his post on a two-year contract, would be returning home after only a year and a half.[60] These speculations were confirmed by the Foreign Office (FO) and noted that "Karamat will not be in the reception line at the Chaklala Airbase to welcome President George Bush.[61]
After his ambassadorship, General Karamat founded a socio-political policy and analysis institute, Spearhead Research, which focuses on social, economic, military and political issues concerning Pakistan and Afghanistan. General Karamat is the director and contributor to the Spearhead Research Institute.
^ abKhan, Feroze (2010). "CIvil-military relations and problems". Eating Grass: the making of Pakistan's atomic bomb. Stanford, Calif. [u.s.]: §Stanford University Press. ISBN978-0804784801.
^Beaumont, edited by Christophe Jaffrelot; translated by Gillian (2004). "§No National Integration Yet?". A history of Pakistan and its origins (New ed.). London: Anthem. ISBN1843311496. {{cite book}}: |first1= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Staff writers and editors (1995). "Pakistan & Gulf Economist: Jehangir Karamat COAS". Economist Publications, 1995. 14 (40–52). {{cite journal}}: |last1= has generic name (help)
^editorial (1996). "Jehangir Karamat, COAS". Biographical work published by the News International's editorial section in 1996. The News International, 1996. The News International, 1996.
^"Karamat Ahmed". geni_family_tree. 24 May 2015. Retrieved 27 November 2017.
^Aslan, Ömer (2017). "External Support"(google books). The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan: Between Conspiracy and Reality (1st ed.). New York, U.S.: Springer. p. 270. ISBN9783319660110. Retrieved 28 November 2017.
^Husain, war despatches of Major General Abrar (2005). Men of steel : 6 Armoured Division in the 1965 war. Rawalpindi: Army Education Publishing House, Army Education Directorate GHQ. ISBN9698125191.
^Karamat named COAS. Economist Publications. 1995.
^ abAli, Sartaj Aziz; foreword by Syed Babar (2009). "Second War". Between dreams and realities : some milestones in Pakistan's history (1. publ. ed.). Karachi: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0195477184.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^ abQureshi, Hakeem Arshad (2013). 1971 indo-pak war : a soldier's narrative. [S.l.] Pakistan: Oup Pakistan. ISBN978-0199067145.
^ abAmin, Agha Humayun (2010). India Pakistan Wars-1947 to 1971-A Strategic and Operational Analysis. London: Strategicus and Tacticus. p. 723. ISBN9780557519842.
^Karamat, J. (1984). "The Tank that Failed". Hilal Magazine. 2 (8). Work published by then-Brigadier J. Karamat at the Inspector General Training and Evaluation Branch, General Headquarters: 69.
^ehgal, Ikram ul-Majeed (2003). Defence Journal: With Former COAS Watching Live-Fire Demonstration. Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal.
^Lavoy, Peter R. (2009). "Pakistan's motivations and calculations."(googlebooks). Asymmetric warfare in South Asia : the causes and consequences of the Kargil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-76721-7. Retrieved 18 December 2017.
^ abHasanie, Ali Abbas (2013). Democracy in pakistan : crises, conflicts and hope for a change. [S.l.]: Authorhouse. ISBN978-1481790680.
^Mishra, Keshav (2004). Rapprochement across the Himalayas : emerging India-China relations in post Cold War period (1947–2003). New Delhi: Kalpaz Publ. ISBN817835294X.
^Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleh (2 June 2000). "When Mountains Move – The Story of Chagai". Article written by RMS Azam ives a detailed account of events and personalities leading to Pakistan first nuclear explosion. The Nation, 1998. The Nation, 1998. Archived from the original on 1 April 2012. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
^Aziz, PhD (Economics), Sartaj (2009) [2009], Between dreams and realities: some milestones in Pakistan's history (Illustrated ed.), Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 408, ISBN978-0-19-547718-4
^ abcCohen, Stephen Philip (2004). The idea of Pakistan (1st pbk. ed.). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. p. 150. ISBN0815797613. Jehangir Karamat National Security Council.
^Dutt, Sanjay (2000). Inside Pakistan : 52 years outlook. New Delhi: APH Pub. Corp. ISBN8176481572.
^APP (10 December 2004). "Gen Karamat meets Bush". Daily Times, Washington. Daily Times, Washington. Archived from the original on 9 January 2015. Retrieved 9 January 2015.