俄罗斯1993年宪政危机(俄語:События сентября — октября 1993 года в Москве),又称十月政变,為該年9月21日於俄羅斯國內發生的一場權力鬥爭,時任俄罗斯总统叶利钦獲勝。当时叶利钦仍掌握军队,这决定了危机的最后结局。军队後來包围了俄罗斯苏维埃所在地俄罗斯最高苏维埃。為推行改革,葉利欽最終以武力強行解散俄罗斯联邦當時的苏维埃议会。这十天是自1917年十月革命以来俄罗斯死伤最惨重的街头運動與斗争風波。
为此,总统叶利钦做出了戏剧性的反应。3月20日,叶利钦直接在电视上发表了讲话,宣布签署一条关于“特殊政府”(俄語:Об особом порядке управления до преодоления кризиса власти)的法令。这表示在新宪,拥有公信力总统和副总统的公投结果出来之前,现总统将担负起特殊的行政权力。叶利钦同时尖锐的抨击了议会,指责他们是在试图重建苏联时期的秩序。
叶利钦解散议会的行为激起了民众骚乱并使得越来越多的人反对他的新自由主义经济改革。成千上万的市民走上莫斯科街头试图声援议会。示威者抗议自己的生活条件在日趋恶化。在1989年以来,全国生产总值在下降,贪腐成风,暴力犯罪激涨而医疗体系趋于崩溃,人均寿命也在下降。叶利钦也日趋受到指责。[19] 莫斯科外,俄罗斯人民感到了困惑和混乱。然而,其中的一些人还在表达他们的抗议。俄全境各地区都有零星的罢工事件发生。抗议者中有共产党人,民族主义者以及俄国家拯救阵线的成员。一部分“俄罗斯国家联盟”(Russian National Unity)的退伍老兵占领了俄白宫。[20] 由于其中有德涅斯特势力的存在(包括一支克格勃支队),激起亚历山大·列别德反对德涅斯特势力干涉俄罗斯内政事务[21][22]。
^The Central Bank's efforts got in the way of pro-Yeltsin, Western-oriented leaders were seeking to carry out a decisive neoliberal economic transformation of Russia. They undermined the regime of fiscal austerity that the Yeltsin government was attempting to pursue. See, e.g., Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2002), p. 50.
^on March 24, 1993. - Белкин А.А. Дело о Президентском обращении к народу 20 марта 1993 года - "Правоведение", № 3 1994. Available at 存档副本. [2009-07-16]. (原始内容存档于2011-07-23). accessed on July 16, 2009
^Executive decree authority By John M. Carey, Matthew Soberg. p. 76互联网档案馆的存檔,存档日期2013-06-22.
^the Congress enabled this formerly-suspended amendment after it had failed to impeach Yeltsin after his declaration of a 'Special Rule' in March, 1993
^Changing channels
By Ellen Propper Mickiewicz p. 126互联网档案馆的存檔,存档日期2013-06-17..
^A Guide to the Economies in Transition
By Ian Jeffries p. 113
^It is still hotly debated among Western economists, social scientists, and policymakers as to whether or not the IMF-, World Bank-, and U.S. Treasury Department-backed reform policies adopted in Russia, often called "shock therapy," were responsible for Russia's poor record of economic performance in the 1990s. Under the Western-backed economic program adopted by Yeltsin, the Russian government took several radical measures at once that were supposed to stabilize the economy by bringing state spending and revenues into balance and by letting market demand determine the prices and supply of goods. Under the reforms, the government let most prices float, raised taxes, and cut back sharply on spending in industry and construction. These policies caused widespread hardship as many state enterprises found themselves without orders or financing. The rationale of the program was to squeeze the built-in inflationary pressure out of the economy so that producers would begin making sensible decisions about production, pricing and investment instead of chronically overusing resources, as in the Soviet era. By letting the market rather than central planers determine prices, product mixes, output levels, and the like, the reformers intended to create an incentive structure in the economy where efficiency and risk would be rewarded and waste and carelessness were punished. Removing the causes of chronic inflation, the reform's architects argued, was a precondition for all other reforms: Hyperinflation would wreck both democracy and economic progress, they argued; only by stabilizing the state budget could the government proceed to restructure the economy. A similar reform program had been adopted in Poland in January 1990, with generally favorable results. However, Western critics of Yeltsin's reform, most notably Joseph Stiglitz and Marshall Goldman (who would have favored a more "gradual" transition to market capitalism), consider policies adopted in Poland ill-suited for Russia, given that the impact of communism on the Polish economy and political culture was far less indelible. 存档副本. [2009-07-12]. (原始内容存档于2009-06-03).. - Criticism on Stiglitz's perspective is found in 'Whence Reform? A Critique of the Stiglitz Perspective互联网档案馆的存檔,存档日期2011-06-07.' by M. Dabrowski, S. Gomulka, J. Rostowski. Accessed 2009-07-13. Archived 2009-07-21.
^For further details see Rusnet.nl, "Pavel Grachev" 存档副本. [2009-07-12]. (原始内容存档于2008-10-13). Updated March 12, 2003
^Since the release of Argentine political scientist Juan Linz's 1985 influential essay "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" the argument that presidentialism is less likely to sustain stable democratic regimes has gained widespread currency in Western comparative politics literature. According to Linz, conflict is always latent between the president and the legislature due to competing claims to legitimacy derived from the same source: electoral mandates from the very same body of citizens. Thus, a conflict can escalate dramatically since it cannot be resolved through rules, procedures, negotiations, or compromise.
^See, e.g., Stephen White, "Russia: Presidential Leadership under Yeltsin," in Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 57–61.